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Introduction 
In the accounting domain ‘asset measurement’, notably, transactions-based 
measurement, drives the ‘asset recognition’ process based on the reasoning that if 
one can reliably measure an intangible asset (IA), de facto, one has simultaneously 
recognised it
[a]
. In the intellectual capital (IC) domain, though, this logic is rightly 
reversed otherwise one cannot be too sure of what one is measuring. So, an 
equivalent opposite stance in the IC domain refers to structuralisation (Johnson, 
2002): the a-priori process of turning the unrecognisable, intangible, tacit knowledge 
in a person’s brain into a recognisable, tangible, explicit form. In this paper we 
present artefact-based asset recognition criteria as a form of structuralisation. 
Artefact-based asset recognition criteria could be a conduit through which 
intellectual capital could enter the accounting domain, a domain dominated by the 
maintenance of financial capital, not intellectual capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
[a] An often quoted and humorous analogy used to refute the need to recognise an 
intangible asset, other than on the basis of a measurement, is that if a thing has some 
of the characteristics of a dog, for instance, it barks like a dog, then it must be a dog. 
One does not need to see or physically touch it to be able to recognise it as a dog! 
However, this is a far from satisfactory way of recognising a dog, let alone the type 
of dog. What is required is a more precision so that the separable recognition of a 
dog, according to some criteria, cannot be confused with, say, the separable 
recognition of a wolf. Worst still, what if it turned out to be a man-made recording 
of a dog and there was no animal at all. One cannot imagine, for example, the 
medical profession adopting a similar stance: the illness has some of the 
characteristics of influenza but then it turns out to be meningitis! The medical 
profession is able to support operational definitions and assessment criteria for the 
diagnosis of illnesses through scientific testing, however, in accounting such 
procedures appear to be less well articulated.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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An implication of the introductory paragraph is that the terms IA and IC are 
interchangeable whereas actually the delineation is unclear - see Figure 1.  
    Insert Figure 1 here 
Nevertheless, we have chosen the IA pathway because we wish to only adopt the 
money metric of the accounting domain in respect of the asset recognition criteria 
presented herein.  
 
The epistemological foundation of financial accounting is mostly grounded on 
definitions and rules of which the definition of an asset is a central feature (ASB, 
1999, para4.7-23; FASB, 1985, para6.25-33; IASB, 2001, para49, 53-59), the latest 
revision being: 
“An asset of an entity is a present right, or other access, to an existing economic 
resource with the ability to generate economic benefits to the entity” (IASB 
Update, December 2007 at www.iasb.org.uk) 
 
On this basis, IC could be regarded as “…an existing economic resource…”. 
However, as Weetman (1989) rightly points out, the need to define a resource 
simply replaces the need to define an asset. The point is that the above definition is 
capable of wide interpretation and, therefore, facilitates similarly wide accounting 
discretion as to what will or will not count as an asset (see Samuelson (1996) and 
Schuetze (1993) for critiques, historically).  
 
Gerboth (1987) argues that the existence of definitions hardly matters at all in 
deciding most issues of real-world consequence and in this vain we detach ourselves 
from the definitional approach to advance instead the case for the use of artefact-
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based
[b]
 asset recognition criteria as presented in the fourteen descriptors (rows) in 
summary in Table 1.  
    Insert Table 1 here 
There is no single source that could be said to inform on the content of Table 1 
though the starting point for its construction was grounded on Honoré (1961). So, 
the construction of Table 1 is a product of the authors’ invention over many years of 
exposure to multi-disciplinary literatures. Many of the constructed criteria refer to 
rights but rights are empty without some physical and legal evidence that they are a 
business entity’s rights, otherwise, anyone could potentially claim them. Thus, we 
refer to the need for a supporting artefact. Our epistemology is criteria-led, as 
opposed to the definition-led stance outlined above. However, what about the related 
ontological positioning? The existing definition-led stance, above, is social-
constructionist in nature and benchmarked against a claim that the construction is 
“representative of real world economic phenomena” (IASB, 2008) – a clear 
economic stance as evidenced, for example, in the definition of an asset previously. 
In contrast, the ontological stance of this paper is also social-constructionist but any 
representation of financial reality is both self-referential and grounded on physical 
and legalistic evidence, which is why we advance the case for artefacts for 
intangible asset recognition purposes. In this case, the ontology draws upon Wand 
and Weber’s (1995) “fundamental premise” to their work on information systems, 
specifically, that “a physical-symbol system has the necessary and sufficient 
properties to represent real-world meaning”. Also, that “an information system is an 
artifactual representation of a real-world system as perceived by someone, built to 
perform information processing functions”. In this regard, we break free from any 
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abstract notion of “economic phenomena” (whatever that means?) and replace it 
with one that is physically and, in our case, legally grounded through the medium of 
artefacts. 
  
As one can see from the columns in Table 1, we apply those criteria to 
organisational ‘assets’: two intellectual property ‘assets’, that is, trademarks and 
trade secrets, and two infrastructure assets, that is, management processes and 
information systems, all taken from Table 2.  
    Insert Table 2 here 
These four ‘assets’ are predominantly intangible in nature and arguably draw their 
identity from the IC domain (see Edvinson and Malone, 1997) rather than the 
financial accounting domain where they would be unlikely to be reported as assets 
(see Upton, 2001, p69 for list of separable intangible assets, also, Seetharaman et al, 
2004, p525 for a list of separable and inseparable intangible assets – an alternative to 
Table 2 perhaps?). There is nothing to stop the criteria being applied to all of the  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
[b] An artefact is something that is given shape by man, in this case, the intangible 
intellectual creativity is given a surrogate tangible shape, typically though not 
exclusively, through documentation that assigns legal rights to an owner and/or user 
(see Honoré, 1961). In the legal domain, as with the accounting domain, the 
alternative basis of using definitions are useful for instruction but any attempt to 
reduce judgements to deductions based on them could easily lead to the occasional 
miscarriage of justice because there are always exceptions. Nevertheless, the desire 
for the logic and structure offered by definitions, in whatever domain, is deeply 
rooted in the human psyche. Consider, for example, those used in medical 
diagnoses, for as Holmes (1897) suggests, the logical method and form flatter the 
longing for certainty that is in every human mind. Yet, the quest for certainty in any 
defined social construction is illusory because it is always contestable. In this regard, 
artefact-based asset recognition criteria are no different to a definitions-based 
approach and can only be advanced on the equally contestable basis that they offer a 
‘better’ social construction.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 6 
items in Table 2 and more. In that latter sense, it is unimportant as to whether Table 
2 is comprehensive or not. So, for example, the criteria have already been applied to 
human assets in another paper (see Tollington and El-Tawy, 2010). We apply the 
criteria to four identified organisational assets here simply because they have not 
been assessed before now and the choice is an arbitrary one.  
 
As you can see from Table 1, the artefact-based asset recognition criteria to be 
explored in this paper are presented in three groups based on the idea that an asset 
should be functional, separable and measurable. These three features are presented  
in the three circles in Figure 2, the intersections between them being where the 
Table 1 criteria are located in their three groups: separable function, measurable 
function, separable measurement.  
    Insert Figure 2 here  
The square boundary in Figure 2 encompasses all assets and within it the three 
intersecting circles represents the separable assets that could or should be 
recognisable for financial reporting purposes. The space between the circles and the 
square boundary represents those inseparable assets the recognition and 
measurement of which are indeterminate for financial reporting purposes. In this 
latter regard Figure 2 should cause one to think about ‘assets’ that are not separable, 
for example, goodwill, or ‘assets’ that are probably not measurable, for example, 
leadership skills, yet, both of these assets (if they be so) may impact upon the 
bottom line. It follows that the construction and use of artefact-based asset 
recognition criteria does not imply that they are either exclusive (all the attributes of 
an asset can be classified) or exhaustive (the attributes of an asset belong only to that 
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element) in attempting to capture all the attributes of an asset (see Gröjer, 2001 
where such approaches are regarded as a process of simplification).  
 
To summarise this introductory section: Table 1 presents asset recognition criteria in 
three groups drawn from a tripartite structure presented in Figure 2 that will be 
explained and then applied later on in the paper to four of the organisational assets 
as extracted from Table 2. 
 
 
The subsequent structure of the paper 
The next three sections of the paper are based upon the three groups of criteria 
presented in Table 1 as explained and then applied to the four identified 
organisational ‘assets’. The final section thereafter presents a discussion about the 
merits, or otherwise, of using artefact-based asset recognition criteria.  
 
An intangible asset’s separable function (Table 1, Figure 2)   
An asset’s function in the accounting domain is typically “…to generate economic 
benefits to the entity…” per the definition of an asset, previously. However, that 
function can change as society changes. For example, carbon-offsetting quotas are 
tradable intangible assets because society decrees that they should be so, but the 
principal benefit is environmental, not economic. There is no “…existing economic 
resource…” here until it is created by statute and insofar as an intangible resource 
exists (a contradiction in terms?) the resource actually comprises a legal right to pay, 
or be paid, to pollute according to fixed quotas. And herein lies a possible tautology 
in the definition of an asset previously: “An asset of an entity is a present right, or 
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other access, to an existing economic right” if the resource is effectively a right to 
pollute. One can extend this resource argument further by saying that the missing 
resource in respect of an intangible asset is, in effect, as much about preventing 
others from competing with you as it is about the individual, or company, being the 
controlling beneficiary of their own intellectual creativity. ‘Rights’ are the pertinent 
issue here because the above ‘economic benefits’ function of an asset is secondary 
to the primary function: a right to control how the secondary function is to be 
fulfilled and to prevent others from doing so.    
Now that we have addressed the functional aspect let us turn our attention to an 
asset’s separable-ness or separability. The Companies Act 1985 Sch.4A,9(2)) refers 
to the separable function of an asset as being capable of being disposed of or 
discharged separately without disposing of a business of the undertaking. However, 
disposing of or discharging an intangible asset is clearly problematic without some 
evidence to that effect. Hence, the need for a tangible surrogate: an artefact. And this 
is the means by which the criteria in Tables 3a – 3h may be applied to the process of 
intangible asset recognition, which also includes disposing or discharging in a 
‘capability of transference’ criterion (Table 3d). 
     Insert Tables 3a-h here 
We define separability differently to the above narrow legal viewpoint. Specifically, 
all the individual assets of a business are separable from each other when it is 
possible to aggregate them (Li, 2002) without loss or gain in the recognition and 
measurement of those individual assets such that the sum of them would always be 
equal to the whole of the assets of the business (see also IASB 2005b, CL8). The 
‘whole’ in this case would only comprise those assets possessing the features of the 
three circles in Figure 2. A problem, though, is in setting an appropriate lowest level 
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for the recognition of an individual ‘asset’. Consider, for example, at the lowest 
level of aggregation one can record labour payroll costs: inputs. However, at a 
higher level of aggregation, part of those labour costs may then be included in a 
constructed infrastructure asset – outputs. To record inputs and outputs as assets at 
the same time is to risk double-counting. It is worth noting, though, that there will be 
those parties outside the accounting domain who may regard the above ‘inputs’ as 
investments in human assets (see Offstein, Gnyawali, Cobb, 2005; Carmeli and 
Schaubroek, 2005): a sentient renewable resource and, as such, double-counting is 
acceptable: the human asset and the infrastructure asset. 
 
Whilst the ‘sum of the parts’ should theoretically equal the ‘whole’, in practice this 
is somewhat problematic (see Barth, 2007) particularly when dealing with intangible 
assets because some of them, like goodwill, are inherently inseparable from the 
other assets of a business. Napier and Power (1992) do not try to recognise a 
separable function because they argue that many intangible asset valuation methods 
“determine, rather than depend upon, separability”. Such comments tend to confirm 
the introductory assertion that in the accounting domain intangible asset 
measurement substitutes for intangible asset recognition. We disagree because an 
artefact may substitute for asset recognition purposes. The use of artefacts represents 
an expanded boundary for accountants but probably still a restrictive one to other 
interest groups including those from the IC domain. For example, as any marketer 
will tell you, a brand is more than its related trademark (see Aaker, 1991). For 
example, as any HRM person will tell you, an employee is more than what they 
create. But the boundary has to be drawn somewhere and we do so by using 
artefacts. 
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An intangible asset’s measurable function (Table 1, Figure 2)   
Since it is not intangible assets per se that are measurable, rather, their function 
(notably in respect of ‘rights’ previously), the specific function envisaged here is the 
capacity to increase or decrease business value through holding assets (capital gains 
or losses) or using assets (revenue gains or losses) to increase or decrease income 
(whether realised or not), the two types of increases or decreases being known 
together as comprehensive income (Bertoni and De Rosa, 2005; Cauwenberge and 
De Beelde, 2007; IASB, 2003; Newberry, 2003; Barker, 2004). In accounting terms 
the recording of comprehensive income represents the increase in the value of all 
disclosed assets between two balance sheet dates and links directly to the concept of 
how capital is to be maintained by such means (see Hicks, 1939; Gynther, 1970; 
Revsine, 1981; Tweedie and Whittington, 1984; Guttierrez and Whittington, 1997; 
Arden, 2005). Priority is given to balance sheet values rather than the income 
statement (see Paton and Littleton, 1940). We support the theoretical notion of 
comprehensive income whilst also practically acknowledging that an intangible 
‘asset’ may increase income and yet be financially un-measurable, for example, a 
superior management team. In other words, an intangible asset (if it be one in 
respect of all the other criteria) may have a function but not necessarily a measurable 
function – see Tables 3i-k.  
    Insert Tables 3i-k here 
 
An intangible asset’s separable measurement (Table 1, Figure 2)   
Where the income measurement method also determines the value of the asset(s) the 
right to capital (criterion 2i) and the right to income (criterion 2k) are conflated. 
 11 
Damant (ASB, 1995), however, would argue that an asset has a separable 
measurement only if it has a value that is completely independent of what it is 
earning in the activity under analysis. In other words, there should be a clear 
separation between the right to capital (criterion 2i) and the right to income 
(criterion 2k) in terms of the latter determining the value of the former. In a 
transactions-based approach to accounting this is not a problem: one records the 
transactions-based capital expenditure as an asset and, subsequently, the transactions 
based revenue income, less expenses, is recorded separately from the capital (see 
Tollington, 2001). However, in some valuations-based approaches to recording asset 
values, such as discounted cash flow methods (DCF), the asset values are based 
entirely on a predictive, not observable (criterion 3m) assessment of future incomes 
– the capital and income are inseparable from each other.  
 
Whilst we have briefly focused on one measurement method, DCF, in order to the 
highlight a selective application of the criteria, we do not intend to address the issue 
of an appropriate measure method because it is primarily an accounting problem. 
The intention, instead, is to precondition ones view towards the process of asset 
measurement, which logically follows from the process of asset recognition, per the 
introductory paragraph to this paper. The relevant three criteria in this regard are 
presented in Tables 3l-n. 
    Insert Tables 3l-n here 
 
That preconditioning though is of a normative nature. So, for example, despite our 
criterion that any measurement should be observable, it is entirely possible to 
construct an accounting approach based on predictive values if needs be and there 
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would be plenty of models in the IC domain alone to choose from. In that regard 
consider the following brief review in Table 4  
    Insert Table 4 here 
 
The principal feature of a ‘separable measurement’ is that any asset measurement 
should be both individual and additive so that, in principle, the measurement of ‘the 
whole’ disclosed picture of financial reality, however that is measured and 
represented, is equal to the ‘sum of its individual disclosed parts’, whether 
aggregated or disaggregated (see previous definition of separability). An 
individually purchased trademark, for example, may be easily aggregated with any 
other asset (the part is added to the whole) but when it is purchased as part of a 
business investment it may be somewhat difficult to disaggregate its separable value 
(splitting the whole into its parts). For the inseparable, non-artefact based intangible 
‘assets’ the disaggregation problem is more acute, inherently so. However, if one 
reports to management at the highest level of a business investment then there is no 
problem because the overall economic function of that recorded investment 
potentially incorporates all the synergistic economic benefits from inseparable 
‘assets’, such as from management processes (Table 2) and any related human 
‘assets’. It is only when that investment is disaggregated for accounting disclosure 
purposes that the above problem of measuring the inseparable intangible assets 
arises, which accountants partly try to solve by bundling them together under the 
generic heading of purchased goodwill.  
 
The aggregation/disaggregation issue and the related double-counting issue, both 
previously, are clearly not easy ones to resolve. We argue that the lowest level of 
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aggregation should be disclosed wherever appropriate so that the constituency of 
expenditures is known (criterion 3n).  However, that constituency in respect of an 
intangible asset is unrecognisable in the absence of an artefact and therefore 
separately un-measurable if, to repeat, one accepts the previous a-priori logic of 
asset recognition before asset measurement.  
 
A discussion about the contribution of this paper    
If we look at Table 1 then, on the balance of ‘No’ to ‘Yes’ responses, we can 
dismiss trade secrets and management processes as assets. On the same basis we 
would accept trademarks and information systems as assets but of course the 
unanswered question is whether all the boxes have to be ticked ‘Yes’ for an asset to 
be confirmed. If that is so then the challenge lies in respects of criterion 3l and 
criterion 3m in Table 1. In this regard, consider again the previous comments of 
Arthur Andersen (1992) in Table 3m and the observation of compliance with a 
valuation method established by an accounting rule. This may well satisfy ‘criterion 
m’ but any valuation-based measurement is still likely to be non-additive (criterion 
3l). Indeed, the accounting profession can never win in that regard because, as soon 
as one mixes money and time, money measurement over time becomes inherently 
non-additive if only because of the effects of inflation. All one can do is to limit that 
non-additivity by choosing one measurement basis in one time frame, for example, 
the value of an asset realised or replaced today. 
 
Barth (2007, p12) rightly points out in respect of market based fair value 
measurements, that the sum of the balance sheet assets less liabilities is unlikely to 
equal the market value of the equity because not every ‘asset’ is recognisable. So, 
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for example, we refer to ‘assets’ in the paper but the term lacks clarity such that 
some assets may have a role that is not only economic, for example, a company car 
used socially or public monuments (Mautz, 1988; Pallot, 1990) where heritage is as 
important as income. One may look at the ‘prohibition of harmful use’ criterion  
(criterion 1f) in a similar vain, that is, first, it appears to be out of character with the 
economic thrust of the other criteria and, second, it seems unlikely that this criteria 
would ever be categorised as anything other than a ‘Yes’ response. That said, just as 
the intangible wealth drivers in our economy have gathered pace over the past few 
decades (Quah, 1997), it seems likely that, as businesses compete for globally scarce 
resources, the issue of sustainability will come to the fore. Thus, the concept of 
‘harmful use’ may actually spawn a whole subset of legal rights as social norms 
adjust to changing economic reality and our survival on this planet. We are already 
seeing that occurring in respect of carbon trading and, like the money metric and the 
time metric, the carbon metric is likely to be additive individually. There is also the 
consideration of whether these metrics can be mixed together too to form a 
completely new way of reporting assets? 
 
In this paper we have stepped outside the accounting domain to look back into it on 
a fundamental aspect of accounting: asset recognition criteria that was considered 
once and rejected on the rather dubious grounds of introducing circularity (though 
no example was identified at the time - ASB, 1999). The advantage of our redrawn 
artefact-based boundary line, though, is that most transactions have one: an invoice, 
a payslip etc. In other words, artefact-based recognition is a broader basis for asset 
recognition, which can capture all that currently exists in the accounting domain and 
more (see Lev and Zarowin, 1999 on ‘boundaries). The ‘more’ is what we have 
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concentrated on here by looking at four problematic organisational intangible 
‘assets’ but, of course, the application of these criteria is applicable to all assets. For 
example, consider whether, if goodwill is inseparable from the other assets of a 
business, it would pass the separability based criteria presented in this paper? The 
development work continues.  
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Figure 1: Types of IC and IA 
 
Many authors refer to IC in terms of a resource contributing to organisational 
performance (see Chatzkel, 2000a,b; Brennan and Connell, 2000; Guthrie and Petty, 
2000; Carroll and Tansey, 2000; Hunt, 2003; Leliaert et.al, 2003; Guthrie, 2001; 
Chatzkel, 2001a,b; Seetharaman et.al, 2002, 2004; Lim and Dallimore, 2004; Marr 
et.al, 2004; Pike et.al, 2005; Boedler et.al, 2005; Flostrand, 2006; O'Donnell et.al, 
2006a,b; Jorgensen, 2006). 
The various definitions can be grouped as follows with the distinction between (b) 
and (c) being a marginal one: 
(a) an Accounting (asset) perspective where IC is variously referred to as 
knowledge-based items (Carroll & Tansey, 2000) convertible into profit 
(Harrison & Sullivan, 2000), intellectual assets less intellectual liabilities 
(Candy, 2000), a moving force for business success (Goh, 2005), stocks of 
what matters to the creation of enterprise value (Burgman et.al, 2005), as 
well as, perhaps, the more traditional view of non financial fixed assets that 
do not have physical substance (Marr et al, 2005). 
(b) a Finance (market) perspective where IC is defined as the difference between 
the market value of the firm and its book value (see Joia, 2000; Pablos, 2003) 
arising from the added value (Sudersanam et.al, 2006) of ‘assets’ 
contributing to tangible output (Swart, 2006) but which are so embedded that 
they are not susceptible to a secondary market by which they could be valued 
(Housel and Nelson, 2005).  
(c)  an Economic (wealth) perspective where IC one of the factors of production 
(Tome, 2004) deployed in the pursuit of wealth creation (Rastogo, 2003; 
Bygdas et al, 2004).  
 
 24 
 
 
Figure 2: The boundary for asset recognition 
 
Table 1: Asset Recognition Criteria Trade-
marks  
Trade 
Secrets 
Mgt.  
Process 
Info. 
Systems  
Separable Function ( Tables 1a-h)      
1a. Right to control Yes No No Yes 
1b. Right to future use Yes No No Yes 
1c. Right to security Yes No No Yes 
1d. Capability of transference Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1e. The absence of a duration Yes No No/Yes Yes 
1f. The prohibition of harmful use Yes No Yes Yes 
1g. The liability to execution Yes No No Yes 
1h. The right to residuary character Yes No No Yes 
Measurable Function (Tables2i-k)     
2i. The right to capital Yes Yes No Yes 
2j. The right to discharge capital Yes Yes No Yes 
2k. The right to income Yes Yes No Yes 
Separable Measurement (Tables 3l-n)     
3l. Additive measurement method  No Yes No No 
 
  
    
 
 
Separable 
Functional 
Measurable 
Separable 
Function 
Separable 
Measurement 
Measurable 
Function 
 Asset 
Inseparable 
and/or 
immeasurable 
and/or   
dysfunctional 
assets 
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3m. Observed measurements only No No No No 
3n. Bundles of assets disallowed Yes No No Yes 
 
Table 2: Types of Intellectual Capital (see Dzinkowski, 2000) 
Human capital Customer (relational) capital 
1. Know-how 1. Brands 
2. Education 2. Customers 
3. Vocational qualifications 3. Company names 
4. Work-related knowledge 4. Backlog orders 
5. Occupational assessments 5. Distribution channels 
6. Psychometric assessments 6. Business collaborations 
7. Work-related competencies 7. Licensing agreements 
8. Entrepreneurial elan, 
innovativeness, proactive and reactive 
abilities, changeability.    
8. Favourable contracts 
 9. Franchising agreements 
Organisational (structural) capital 
Intellectual property Infrastructure assets 
1. Patents 1. Management philosophy 
2. Copyrights 2. Corporate culture 
3. Design rights 3. Management processes 
4. Trade secrets 4. Information systems 
5. Trademarks 5. Networking systems 
6. Service marks 6. Financial relations 
 
Table 4: IC measurement methods (Pike & Roos, 2004 )                       
Direct Intellectual Capital methods: 
Caddy (2000):  Intellectual Capital Formula 
McPherson & Pike (2001) Inclusive Valuation Methodology 
Rodov & Leliaert (2002): Financial Method of Intangible Assets Measurement 
Andriesson (2005): Value Explorer 
Housel & Nelson (2005): Knowledge Valuation Analysis (KVA) 
Market Capitalization methods: 
Housel & Nelson (2005):  Market or Value Based Approach  
Tobin J: [adapted by Housel & Nelson (2005)]: Tobin’s q        
Sudersanam et.al (2006): Real Option Models (ROM) 
Return on Assets methods: 
Lev (2001): Residual Income Model [adapted by Housel & Nelson (2005)]                           
Chen et.al (2005): Value Added Intellectual Coefficient (VAIC) 
Burgman et.al (2005): Future Value Management Methodology (FVMT) 
Scorecard methods: 
Liebowitz & Suen (2000): Proposed Knowledge Management Metrics 
Carroll & Tansey (2000): Metrics to measure human capital & structural capital 
Low (2000): Value Creation Index-VCI 
Hunt (2003): Self-Assessment Computer Analyzed testing (SACAT)  
Bonfour (2003): Dynamic Valuation of intellectual capital (IC-DVAL) 
Bontis (2004): National Intellectual Capital Index 
Pike et.al (2005): Conjoint Value Hierarchy (CVH) 
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Oliver & Porta (2006): Intellectual Capital Cluster Index (ICCI) 
Kaplan & Norton (2006): Balanced scorecard 
Voelpel (2006): Systematic Scorecard (SSC) 
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Table 3a: The right to control an intangible asset 
General Description Trademarks Trade Secrets Management processes  Information systems 
 28 
 
Control is exercised for a 
purpose: appropriation - 
usually income but not 
always. Consider, 
alternatively, lending 
without recompense or 
holding assets to prevent 
control by others. In the 
absence of an artefact 
there is little control over 
who may appropriate. (See 
Booth, 2003, pp312-314 
for other aspects of 
control). 
 
There is no control over 
the tacit knowledge held in 
a person’s head. Control is 
exercised over the artefact: 
the visible representation 
of explicit knowledge held 
physically and separately 
from the individual 
creating it. 
Control over logo’s 
appropriating capabilities 
may be established 
through custom and 
practice and be accepted as 
such without challenge (no 
artefact). However, 
constructive control is 
over the legal property 
rights, which can be 
established by trademark 
registration or by a 
successful action (and 
court order) for the tort of 
‘passing-off’ - both 
artefact based. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record ‘yes’ 
There can be no control 
over tacit knowledge. 
Equally, there can be no 
control over the person in 
whom that tacit knowledge 
is still resident unless one 
believes in slavery. Even 
then control is dependent 
on voluntary compliance.  
 
It is axiomatic that where a 
trade secret is made 
explicit it is no longer 
secret unless physically 
secured somehow, for 
example, a written recipe 
or drug formula kept in a 
safe. The artefact is 
created thereby but, unlike 
a patent, there is nothing in 
principle to prevent 
copying once the secret is 
shared – no proscription.  
 Record ‘no’ 
Management is centred on 
the actions of human 
beings* even with 
automated processes – 
tangible – irrelevant here.  
 
*Little control anyway 
without voluntary 
compliance, which may be 
selectively and repeatedly 
modified or withdrawn 
according to circumstance 
and inclination despite the 
existence of a contract of 
employment – the artefact. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Record ‘no’ 
Human beings and 
hardware: both tangible – 
irrelevant here. Since  
software information is 
intangible, control is 
inextricably reliant on the 
physical carrier for the 
magnetic or laser coding, 
such as a CD or laptop – 
the artefact. Exclusive 
control may be lost at the 
touch of a button unless 
the copyright is protected 
– the artefact too. Even 
then, control may be 
impossible if enough 
people are prepared to 
infringe copyright. Thus, 
control is becoming 
increasingly dependent on 
security protocols. 
 
 
Record ‘yes’ 
Table 3b: The right to the future use of an intangible asset 
General Description Trademarks Trade Secrets Management processes  Information systems 
If the asset is not scarce it may ‘Use or lose it’ One can use a The management process is Physical control over an 
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be used freely by many users – 
seawater, deserts, atmospheric 
nitrogen. With a scarce asset 
future use is linked to restrictive 
controls, often, contractual ones 
(Ijiri, 1975). Scarcity is 
pertinent here because the 
artefact is the way one tries to 
ensure that future use is 
controlled by the user alone, 
who may, or may not, be the 
owner too.  
 
Also, involuntary use is not 
necessarily restricted to income 
generation, as would be the case 
in the financial reporting 
domain. For example, use to 
prevent competition. 
clause to trademark 
registration (the legal 
artefact). Absence of 
an artefact does not 
prevent others from 
use, typically, by 
copying. 
Artefact deters 
copying but use 
cannot be prevented 
unless court 
sanctioned. 
 
Renewal of right to 
future use upon 
expiration of the 
trademark or 
franchise term. 
Record ‘yes’ 
trade secret but 
there is no right 
to use it or right 
to prevent others 
from using it if 
they are able to 
determine the 
nature of the 
secret. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record ‘no’ 
vested in human beings and 
there is no right to use a human 
being, even where contractual 
obligations arise, without 
voluntary compliance. But a 
human being is not an intangible 
asset anyway. 
As regards what managers do, 
any manager can use a 
management process but there is 
no right to use it or right to 
prevent others from using it 
unless an artefact exists for a 
unique process that is protected, 
for example, by a patent. 
Processes like TQM, JIT etc are 
not unique. 
 
Record ‘no’ 
artefact typically rests in one 
entity’s hands whilst the 
future use may be in many 
hands at the same time – not a 
scarce resource.  
In some instances, such as 
domain names, there may be a 
‘use it or lose it’ clause to the 
registration documentation – 
the artefact in this case. It 
follows in these 
circumstances that, unlike 
many other assets, one cannot 
just to hold on to the asset 
with or without a view to 
capital holding gains. 
 
 
Record ‘yes’ 
Table 3c: The right to security in an intangible asset 
General Description Trademarks Trade Secrets Management processes  Information systems 
Security is in the Security in long-lived Inherently, no security in a To repeat, management is Some security in the 
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expectation that 
appropriation will run in 
perpetuity unless 
determined otherwise, 
such as by statute. 
 
A contract or some other 
artefact may secure for a 
lending institution access 
to future appropriations eg. 
royalty income from 
securitised assets, such as 
Robbie Williams music 
copyright. 
super-brands like 
Cadburys particularly 
where it is capable of 
being sold or franchised to 
other businesses, as with, 
for example, Cadburys 
cakes.  
Security is probably less 
likely in an obscure brand. 
 
 
 
 
Record ‘yes’ 
trade secret. For example, 
no one in their right mind 
would securitise against an 
income stream coming 
from an unknown source. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record ‘no’ 
centred on the actions of 
human beings even with 
automated processes. 
There is very little security 
here, unless one believes 
in slavery. However, not 
so respect of the patented 
idea created by them – the 
artefact. That said, in most 
cases, variants of those 
ideas would probably be 
easy to execute without 
infringing any rights. 
Record ‘no’ 
artefact but it is uncertain 
as to its long–lived nature 
because of rapid 
technological change eg. 
Windows software 
upgrades. Appropriation 
may be direct or indirect, 
as with a banking 
information system, but, 
nevertheless, central to the 
security and survival of the 
business.  
 
Record ‘yes’ 
Table 3d: The capability of transference (including disposal/discharge) of an intangible asset 
[c]
 
General Description Trademarks Trade Secrets Management processes  Information systems 
Assumes the existence of an 
artefact so that the business 
entity acquiring the intangible 
Can occur contractually 
and may or may not be 
supported by transference 
Can occur by any 
number of means 
including verbally 
Same as trade secrets and 
information systems 
 
Transference can be almost 
instantaneous, used and then 
discharged without an artefact 
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[c] They are all capable of transference with or without an artefact. The artefact, however, provides evidence in the same way that an invoice 
or payment transfer provides some evidence in the accounting domain, except that no actual business transaction has to necessarily occur. An 
accounting transaction is one form of actualisation of the ‘capability of transference’, a subset that probably has more to do with establishing 
a reliable separable measurement than this specific separable function. Thus, a eureka moment by someone working on a new cyclonic 
vacuum cleaner in his garden shed or the farmer who gains from the birthing of a calf or some unexpected find of mineral deposits on his land 
are all non-transactions-based assets capable of transference and future use. It can be reasonably argued, though, that the attachment of an 
artefact to each asset’s ‘capability of transference’ is no better than the accounting approach in terms of establishing a separable function. All 
it does is to provide the aforementioned evidence: the patented cyclonic vacuum cleaner, the compulsory registering and tagging of the calf 
with DEFRA, the geologists technical report on the size, quality and value of the mineral deposit (except that in the case of the last two assets 
this is additional to their obvious tangible existence).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
asset can demonstrate that the 
right to its future use has passed 
to them. 
 
No actual transference is 
necessary, as with a business 
transaction. The capability is 
sufficient. Asset measurement is 
independent of this capability. 
of a trademark registration 
document – both artefacts. 
Transference can occur 
independently of the other 
assets to which it may 
have been originally tied, 
for instance, the ‘Virgin’ 
brand. 
Record ‘yes’ 
so that the trade 
secret remains in 
a tacit form. No 
artefact is 
required, just a 
good memory. 
 
 
Record ‘yes’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record ‘yes’ 
remaining behind for others to 
use – another exception to the 
‘general description’. However, 
with any form of storage or 
other means of recording the 
information the artefact then 
exists. It is by this means that 
one can prove the right to use. 
Record ‘yes’ 
 32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3e: The absence of a duration 
General Description Trademarks Trade Secrets Management processes  Information systems 
Where the function of an 
intangible asset can be 
The absence of visual 
awareness is no 
There are no social norms, 
legalistic or otherwise. 
Where the function remains 
with the human being the 
Intangible information often 
has a short duration but may 
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separated from the human 
being and is vested in an 
artefact the duration is 
determined by social 
norms, notably, legalistic 
ones… 
 
And where longer use of 
an asset is usually more 
valuable than shorter use. 
guarantee that the 
brand is ‘dead’ eg. 
Triumph motorcycles. 
And a trademark may 
be renewably long-
lived even where 
exposure to the brand 
is minimal. 
 
Record ‘yes’ 
Despite secrecy there is 
nothing to prevent 
duplication eg. a drug 
formula. The duration is 
then ‘zero’ and any 
advantage may be 
extinguished by competitor 
patent registration. 
 
Record ‘no’ 
duration is indeterminable, as 
with tacit knowledge, and 
expires with the person. 
Where the process is 
automated it may be managed 
by another human being for 
the foreseeable future. 
Difficult one! 
 
Record ‘no/yes’ 
be continuously renewed eg. 
weather reports, customer 
lists, Windows ‘98/Xp/Vista 
etc. - all artefact based  with 
or without copyright 
protection which would 
ensure a long duration (but 
not necessarily re use). 
 
Record ‘yes’ 
Table 3f: The pr hibition of har ful use 
General Description Trademarks rade Secrets Management processes  Information systems 
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Asset usage can impose costs 
on others eg pollution costs. 
Because social norms, 
notably, statutory ones, 
indicate who must pay to 
have their interests protected 
against the costs imposed by 
another party, improper use 
of an asset is often 
prohibited. Consider, for 
example, the creation of 
‘carbon credits’ (documented 
artefacts) where pollution 
quotas may be traded within 
and between countries, in the 
same manner as fishing 
quotas, in order to sustain 
life. 
‘Harmfulness’ is a matter of 
social judgement. So, for 
example, a ‘Auschwitz’ 
brand would probably 
regarded as being harmful, 
at least to the Jewish 
community, whereas, the 
‘FCUK’ brand might be 
regarded a being clever, 
rather than harmful, through 
its similarity to a sexual 
swearword.  
Only a fool would 
deliberately set out to 
instigate a hostile response 
to a brand – a self-imposed 
prohibition. 
Record ‘yes’ 
A potentially 
harmful trade 
secret harms no 
one until it is 
used and when 
it is used, 
generally 
speaking, it is 
no longer a 
secret. An 
analysis of 
what has been 
used is usually 
sufficient in 
that regard.  
 
 
Record ‘no’ 
It is axiomatic that a harmful 
management process invites 
the possibility of legal 
sanctions. Equally, whatever 
is created or used by a person 
should not, in principle, be 
harmful to others. However, 
civil law is replete with 
instances where the principle 
fails in practice. Instances 
like Enron and Worldom 
show that management 
processes are often 
insufficient to combat errant 
social action. Indeed, they 
may even encourage it.  
 
Record ‘yes’ in principle 
There are plenty of 
examples of harmful 
information, for example, 
computer viruses, adult 
video gaming, illegal 
downloading, Chinese 
censoring of Google website 
etc. However, in each case 
prohibition is subject to the 
changeable social norms of 
the society using the 
information – harm to one 
party may be protection or a 
warped sense of fun to 
another.  
 
 
Record ‘yes’ in principle 
Table 3g: Liability to execution 
General Description Trademarks Trade Secrets Management processes  Information systems 
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Comprehends a particular 
use:  settling debt. The 
sufficiency of an intangible 
asset for that purpose is a 
matter of agreement between 
the parties and social norms. 
 
The artefact is important 
otherwise the intangible asset 
could potentially become a 
vehicle for defrauding 
creditors, and national 
income would suffer 
accordingly as those with 
liquid capital would be wary 
of lending it to those with 
assets lacking this proviso. 
A high profile 
trademarked brand 
may well be accepted 
in settlement of a debt. 
Anyone with enough 
money can create a 
luxury car but there is 
only one Rolls Royce 
brand and it clearly 
had worth to BMW or 
they would not have 
bought it. A lender 
would know this too.  
 
 
 
Record ‘yes’ 
No artefact, no 
sufficiency for 
intended 
purpose. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record ‘no’ 
Management is vested in 
human beings and human 
beings cannot to used to 
settle debt unless one 
believes in slavery. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record ‘no’ 
Social norms governing privacy of 
information are central to 
establishing the worth available to 
settle debt. A banking IT system, 
whilst the mainstay of the 
business, probably has no value to 
anyone else. But the information 
contained therein (customer 
details), is a different matter 
providing privacy laws allowed 
access.  Other systems eg. 
Windows Vista – the artefact – 
could probably be securitised on 
the basis of a recognisable income 
steam, which could then be used to 
settle debt.  
Record ‘yes’  
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Table 3h: Right to a residuary character 
General Description Trademarks Trade Secrets Management processes  Information systems 
Refers to a situation where the rights to use or 
control lapses. There must be social rules for 
deciding what to do, for whatever reason, 
where the pre-existing legal rights to an 
intangible asset are no longer present. 
For some intangible assets there is no 
residuary character eg. expiration of a patent. 
For others, they may be periodically renewed 
eg. trademark registration. For others, the 
right may be passed after death eg. copyright. 
The statutory 
expiration of a 
trademark unless 
renewed.  
 
Brands may still be 
protected under the 
tort of passing off. 
 
Record ‘yes’ 
No artefact, no 
sufficiency for 
intended 
purpose. 
 
 
 
 
 
Record ‘no’ 
Management is vested in 
human beings and there 
is no residuary character 
if a person decides to 
manage nothing (or even 
dies!). The right must be 
of an involuntary nature. 
 
 
Record ‘no’ 
The right must of an 
involuntary nature 
separate from the 
person, such as 
copyrighted 
documents (the 
artefact), which can 
endure beyond death.    
 
Record ‘yes’ 
 37 
Table 3i: Right to capital 
General Description Trademarks Trade Secrets Management processes  Information systems 
Fisher (1906, p52) refers to 
capital as “a stock of wealth 
existing at an instant in time”, 
Salvary (1997) refers instead to 
a “stock of money” expressed in 
nominal terms. In both cases 
capital is interpreted in financial 
reporting terms as a positive 
difference of assets over 
liabilities at the year-end. The 
amount of that positive 
difference depends on ones view 
of capital maintenance. 
 
A measurable function is 
triggered by the existence of, 
and is traceable to, an artefact: 
the separable product of 
utilising the human ‘asset’ - the 
process of structuralisation 
(Johnson, 2002): turning human 
capital into structural capital 
(see also Edvinson and Malone, 
1997; Johnson, 1999; Stewart, 
1997, Carson et al, 2004) though 
this is not always associated 
The constituent nature of 
brand equity (Aaker, 1991, 
p16) is more broadly based 
than in respect of the 
artefact based focus of this 
paper. Wood (1995, p550), 
though, in referring to de 
Chernatony and McDonald 
(1992), adopts the ‘stock 
of wealth’ argument in that 
brands represent a source 
of “added value” (see also 
Wood, 1996). However, 
where marketers and 
accountants differ would 
undoubtedly be in the 
recognition of the added 
value from such abstract 
sources as identified by 
Aaker (1991) - see Keller, 
(1993) about the different 
motivations of accountants 
and marketers. From the 
accounting perspective the 
only physically verifiable 
brand equity attribute is in 
A well known leading 
cancer specialist who 
declares that he/she 
may has a cure for the 
disease may well be 
paid a considerable 
sum for what only 
they know – the drug 
formula - but as soon 
as they reveal their 
secret the capital is 
instantly dissipated, 
the right then being 
held in many hands 
unless someone 
quickly establishes a 
patent right instead. 
There is no right to 
capital in the secret 
but there may be a 
right in a secret that is 
then revealed. In that 
instance in time the 
capital is immediately 
converted into income 
and both are lost 
Adam Smith (1776) 
argued the case for 
“investments” in human 
beings – an input 
orientation (see also, 
Alfred Marshall, 1890, 
p469; OECD, 1996). 
However, with an output 
orientation, it is what 
human beings do: manage 
processes in this case, 
rather than the human 
beings themselves or what 
they tacitly know, that 
constitutes the measurable 
function
[d]
 here. It follows, 
that if a human being 
decides to do little or 
nothing or to do it badly 
then there is, in principle, 
little or nothing to manage 
and measure. The above 
input investment, if it is 
one, is wasted - the 
argument being reducible 
to one of ‘control’ (Table 
One can capitalise labour 
on an input basis (eg. cost 
of salaries of those 
inputting or constructing 
info. systems) and it is 
clearly measurable but it 
does not necessarily mean 
from the argument re 
management processes 
that a measurable function 
exists. The function lies in 
the subsequent wealth 
creating use of the artefact 
created by labour eg. the 
encoded/printed weather 
report, credit report etc. 
That is electronic 
transference that requires 
physical retention (eg. a 
CD) to evidence the 
‘right’. It is the value of 
the artefact that is 
problematic, labour cost 
being a poor but easily 
measured substitute in that 
regard.  
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[d] It is acknowledged though that this output orientation cannot be completely divorced from an input orientation because there is an obvious 
‘chicken and egg’ type argument here: without the human being in the first place there is no thought, no purpose and no possibility of action. 
 
 
with the existence of an artefact 
in the intellectual capital 
domain.  
respect of the trademark. 
 
Record ‘yes’ 
thereafter. 
 
Record ‘yes’ 
1a).  
 
Record ‘no’ 
 
 
Record ‘yes’  
Table 3j: Right to discharge capital 
General Description Trademarks Trade Secrets Management processes  Information systems 
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Comprehends the right to alienate 
an asset, or to consume it, or to 
destroy or waste it, or by any other 
means, discharge it and thereby 
deny oneself the right to 
appropriate. 
 
The oil rich owners of a patent for 
a safe, cheap, compact and highly 
efficient source of generating 
electricity may, in their own 
interest, simply not use it. Thus it 
may exist as an artefact and it may 
have the potential to produce great 
wealth and yet, in practice, never 
do so – an entity specific, not a 
market specific viewpoint (see 
IASB, 2005b, p51). 
Brand capital or brand equity 
can be discharged 
inadvertently, for example, 
Gerald Ratner of Ratners 
Jewellers talking about his 
“crap products”. However, 
previously damaged brand 
equity, like John West foods, 
can successfully reappear on 
retail shop shelves many years 
after they were first withdrawn. 
It is hard to establish a norm 
but that would not remove the 
right to eliminate a brand, and 
thereby any capital in it, simply 
by permanently removing it 
from public attention. 
Record ‘yes’ 
A secret 
revealed is 
instantly 
discharged.  
The right to do 
so will 
typically be 
vested in only 
a few hands or 
just one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record ‘yes’ 
If there is no capital then 
there is nothing to 
discharge. 
 
Management is a human 
centred process even with 
automated ones – someone 
has to press the on/off 
button! With human 
‘assets’ one can certainly 
alienate them but their 
destruction, consumption 
or wasting is not an option 
unless, perhaps, one 
respectively subscribes to 
execution, cannibalism, 
starvation.  
Record ‘no’ 
Few people want old 
information (historians, 
academics?). In many cases 
the capital tied to the artefact 
will waste quickly: old 
weather reports, old personal 
addresses, old exchange 
rates. Other systems, such as 
gaming systems, may 
endure. In both cases one 
can destroy the artefact 
easily or simply not use it. 
Knowing how much capital 
is discharged thereby is the 
problematic ‘separable 
measurement’ issue. 
  
Record ‘yes’  
Table 3k: Right to income 
General Description Trademarks Trade Secrets Management processes  Information systems 
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The right to income is linked 
to the right to capital, notably, 
in respect of capital 
maintenance (see, for example, 
Whittington, 1974). 
 
The income is from what 
people create, the artefact, 
which is then used to 
appropriate or prevent others 
from appropriating. It is 
prevention that is perhaps the 
more important feature here. 
The right to income is 
strengthened by the existence 
of an artefact but the right can 
also be established by custom 
and practice. 
Refers to the premium 
income appropriated by the 
brand but separating it from 
the income attributable to 
product to which it is 
attached is difficult. 
However, it is entirely 
possible to reconstruct 
charts of accounts to one 
that is market and brand 
orientated, instead. So, 
prima facie, there can be a 
reasonable attempt to 
establish brand related net 
incomes if there was the 
political will to do so. 
 
Record ‘yes’ 
There can be income from a 
trade secret but no right to it 
in the absence of the 
artefact. One man’s secret 
Cola drink-recipe is another 
man’s opportunity to copy 
and appropriate income for 
themselves unless prevented 
by the existence of an 
artefact, for example, a 
patent.  The artefact 
removes secrecy but, at the 
same time, establishes the 
right to income from it. The 
rights to capital and income 
are in effect linked in the 
artefact. 
Record ‘yes’ 
There is no right to 
income if people, for 
example, decide not to 
manage or manage 
incompetently or become 
sick or die, in which case 
a measurable function 
will not exist. Most 
management processes 
are, at least, initiated by 
people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record ‘no’ 
The measurable 
function relates to the 
right to income from 
the artefact, for 
example, a CD of 
encoded software. 
That is what the 
customer pays for. 
The income is not 
from person creating 
or updating the 
information despite 
the obvious ‘chicken 
and egg’ type 
argument
[d again]
.  
  
 
Record ‘yes’  
able 3l: A measurement method should be additive 
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General Description Trademarks Trade Secrets Management processes  Information systems 
Generally, the money metric 
(£/p) and the time metric 
(hrs/mins) are individually 
additive but not when they are 
mixed together at different 
points in time (ASB, 1999, p79; 
IASB, 2001, para.100, IASB, 
2005a) or when they are mixed 
with non-financial metrics. 
 
Choose one financial 
measurement basis at one point 
in time (now, not past, not 
future). “As a rule, human 
potential is not expressed in 
terms of monetary units…The 
same applies to investments in 
human potential (Milost, 2007, 
p124)”. Therefore, measure 
output from a human being, not 
their inputs – salaries etc. 
Various 
measurement 
methods are 
employed (price 
premium, royalty 
payments, P/E 
multipliers etc) and 
therefore they are 
not additive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record ‘no’ 
At the point in time 
where money is paid 
to the cancer specialist 
to reveal his/her secret 
cancer curing drug 
formula then, at that 
time, the amount may 
be added to other 
transactions based 
amounts. Immediately 
thereafter the secret is 
lost and with it the 
capital and future 
income. But, at one 
point in time the 
measurement is 
additive – interesting! 
 
 
 
Record ‘yes’ 
Management processes are linked 
to the concept of the use of a 
human ‘asset’, in this case, their use 
in managing processes. A few 
related measurement methods have 
remained within the money metrics 
of the financial reporting domain: 
the capitalisation of historical costs 
(Likiert, 1967), opportunity cost 
approaches (Hekimian and Jones, 
1967), discounted wages and 
salaries approach (Lev and 
Schwartz, 1971), a replacement 
cost approach (Flamholz, 1973) but 
they all mix money and time, even 
with historical costs. These 
methods are all input centred upon 
the person anyway, not output 
centred upon the artefact created by 
the person. 
Record ‘no’ 
Output centred upon what a 
person creates: artefacts. 
As with trademarks, 
multiple valuation based 
methods can be applied. 
Where an information 
system is purchased, for 
example, a registered 
website domain name, the 
value can be added to other 
transactions- based values 
at that time only. 
Thereafter, value can be 
enhanced (as with Amazon 
or Google) or disappear 
quickly, as GEC Plc found 
to their cost with the 
1990’s internet bubble 
crash. 
 
Record ‘no’  
Table 3m: A measurement should be based on observation 
General Description Trademarks Trade Secrets Management Information systems 
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processes  
One can currently observe a transaction 
based cost or a readily ascertainable 
market value or an event such as a court 
order where the damages can be 
reasonably estimated from documents. 
The same cannot be said for many 
valuation based methods where the time 
frame is often future based and therefore 
not observable. It is the time frame that is 
pertinent because even transactions-
based cost becomes a sub-set of 
valuation-based methods over time. 
The obvious problem of observing 
something that is intangible is obviated 
through the use of physical substitutes: 
artefacts. Whether one would be 
prepared, for example, to accept the 
observed securitisation of a music 
copyright artefact or the observed 
royalties paid for the use of a trademark 
artefact or the options to do so as a valid 
approach for all such assets is unclear, 
but it is not beyond the ‘wit of man’ to 
make it so, or some other model, through 
the accounting regulatory process. 
The observation process 
can be one of verifying 
regulatory compliance in 
the use of a ‘selected 
valuation method’ 
without material error in 
the way the measurement 
is conducted – a process 
of indirect verification. 
Of course, the unresolved 
problem is which method 
constitutes ‘the best’ 
measurement method in 
the first place – a process 
of direct verification (see 
IASB, 2006b; Barth, 
2007, p14). See Arthur 
Andersen & Co. (1992) 
for political lobbying to 
this effect. A difficult 
one to categorise. On 
balance, currently... 
 
 
 
Record ‘no’ 
If it is secret 
then it is not 
observable 
except when it 
is revealed in 
connection 
with a one-off 
transaction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If secret… 
 
Record ‘no’ 
Most observations of 
human beings are in 
respect of what they do 
or have done, such as, 
manage processes. 
Their potential is 
currently observable but 
it is not necessarily an 
indicator of future 
potential. Anything that 
is future based is 
predictive rather than 
observable
[e]
 (see 
Aitken, 1990, p229 for 
further reasons). That 
said, what we want to 
measure here are the 
observed labour 
outputs: the created 
artefacts that subsist 
separately from the 
person (and their future 
potential) – not 
applicable. 
 
Record ‘no’ 
The separable measurement of 
past and current income from 
some artefacts, like CD-based 
gaming software, may be easy to 
observe. For other information 
systems, the income may be non-
existent, for example, encoded 
NHS patient records – an 
observed zero value perhaps? In 
both cases the artefacts are 
observed and based on labour 
outputs, not inputs. The issue 
then becomes whether the 
measurement of capital should be 
based on the observed 
measurements of income, above. 
The short answer is ‘no’ – see 
Damant (ASB, 1995, previously).   
It follows that any observation of 
the value of the artefacts will 
have to be a process of indirect 
verification – same as 
trademarks. Again, a difficult one 
to categorise. On balance, 
currently...  
Record ‘no’  
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[e] The implications for future based valuations such as value-in-use, forecasts, some allocations and even some accounting standards (for example, cash 
generating units as part of impairment reviews) are extensive. It is interesting to note that a recent IASB definition of an asset provides some tentative 
support for this point:“An asset of an entity is a present right, or other access, to an existing economic resource with the ability to generate economic 
benefits to the entity” (IASB, 2006c, IASB Update, December 2007) 
Reference is made in this quote to “present” and “existing” and no mention is made to “future” economic benefits. However, those “economic benefits” 
are still not articulated in terms of a single measurement method. So, for example, if a net realisable value method to accounting is chosen by standard 
setters (see IASB, 2006a), then, in implicitly referring to a future sale (unless actually realized today), the mix of time frames (present and future) would 
still apply even though this future is not explicitly contained in the above definition. Also note that the element of “control” is now missing from the 
definition: a criterion in this paper. Note, also the opposite situation: that the issue of a “resource” (see Hall, 1991, 1992) is missing as a criterion herein 
because, to repeat, the need to specify what a resource is by nature simply replaces the need to specify what an asset is by nature (see Weetman, 1989). 
Table 3n: Bundles of assets should be avoided (wherever possible) 
General Description Trademarks Trade 
Secrets 
Management 
processes  
Information systems 
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A separable measurement should be 
tied to a single asset, rather than as a 
bundle, otherwise, it may be possible 
to inadvertently dispose of or 
discharge individual assets, notably 
the intangible ones, whilst leaving the 
measurement of the bundle intact. 
 
In the absence of an artefact (the 
traceable object) there is a danger, 
particularly in respect of intangible 
assets, that one may end up disclosing 
the measurement of something that 
has little or no function let alone a 
separable function. It is 
acknowledged, though, that this could 
be a practical problem for many 
compound financial derivatives. 
The most controversial criterion 
because, according to Aaker 
(1991), brand equity is a “set of 
assets” ie. bundled, and virtually 
impossible to un-bundle and 
measure separately. We do not 
try. Politically one must decide an 
appropriate lowest level of 
aggregation or, perhaps more 
appropriately, disaggregation at 
which to report assets (is it bricks 
and mortar or is a building?). Our 
decision is based upon the 
trademark artefact. Whatever 
marketing “asset” that may or 
may not be attached thereto (eg. 
name awareness) is ignored in the 
accounting domain. 
Record ‘yes’ 
No need to 
do so. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record no 
No artefact, 
therefore, nothing 
to bundle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record ‘no’ 
The sum of the value of the CD 
copyrights on the individual Harry 
Potter films will probably be greater 
than the boxed set when all of them 
have been released. And a clever 
business person knows how to obtain 
value individually and/or when 
bundled. Likewise with any 
component software of an integrated 
system. The key feature is the artefact 
(the traceable object) because this 
establishes user rights to the 
intangible asset whether individual or 
bundled. The unresolved problem 
though is how to remove duplication 
when trying to establish a separable 
measurement for one or the other or, 
perhaps, both at the same time. 
Record ‘yes’  
